Hands off my fee bills! Texas Supreme Court acknowledges five levels of protection against disclosure of attorney fee bills

“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”


qoZwteIbThis admonishment was given by the United States Supreme Court nearly 35 years ago in Hensley v. Eckerhart, the seminal case that ushered in the requirement of producing detailed fee bill evidence (a requirement now adopted by the Texas Supreme Court). And yet the very situation warned of decades ago is now a certain reality in every case where attorney’s fees are at issue. But this unfortunate reality can now be avoided thanks to a recent Texas Supreme Court holding.

Executive summary

The Texas Supreme Court, in In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 15-0591, 60 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1165, 2017 Tex. LEXIS 522 (June 9, 2017), has acknowledged five applicable levels of protection that can be used to thwart your opponent’s efforts to compel production of your fee bills:

  • Work-product privilege (TRCP 192.5)
  • Attorney-client privilege (TRE 503)
  • Outside the scope of expert discovery (TRCP 192.3 & 195)
  • Irrelevant (TRE 401)
  • Unduly Prejudicial (TRE 403)

Background of the case

In re Nat’l Lloyds stemmed from a discovery dispute involving allegations of underpaid homeowner insurance claims. Scott Doyen, one of the attorneys for the defense, testified as an attorney-fee expert and admitted on cross-examination that an opposing party’s fees could be considered as “a factor” in determining a reasonable fee recovery. This, of course, led to interrogatories seeking aggregate fee information and a request for production of fee bills.

After two non-evidentiary hearings, a discovery special master recommended that:

(1) an opponent’s attorney-billing information is, as a general proposition, relevant to the reasonableness of an attorney-fee request in the same case;

(2) to the extent the discovery requests in this case seek material from an expert witness on the attorney-fee issue, the information falls within the scope of permissible discovery under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(e);

(3) some of the discovery requests should be more narrowly tailored, but the insurer’s objections to the discovery requests as modified should be overruled; and

(4) “[s]pecific records may be redacted for content protected by an appropriate privilege.”

Adopting these recommendations, the MDL pretrial court ordered the insurer to respond to the discovery requests. The insurer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied relief. The court concluded the discovery order was not an abuse of discretion in the underlying cases because:

(1) an opposing party’s attorney fees are germane to at least two factors that inform the “reasonable and necessary” attorney-fee inquiry, as set forth in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.;

(2) the Arthur Anderson factors are explicitly nonexclusive;

(3) the insurer’s designated expert witness previously testified he based his opinion on his own personal experience in defending the same case in which he was testifying as an expert;

(4) the requested information is within the permissible scope of expert-witness discovery, as provided by Rule 192.3(e); and

(5) the insurer produced no evidence that redaction would be insufficient to protect its privileges.

In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 15-0591, 60 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1165, 2017 Tex. LEXIS 522, at *7 (June 9, 2017)

Seems reasonable and well-thought out. The Texas Supreme Court could not disagree more. The opinion is lengthy, but the high points (for quick reference) are found below, with page cites following the quotes.

Work-product privilege (TRCP 192.5)

“Analogizing to our analysis in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Valdez, we hold that a request to produce all billing records invades a party’s work-product privilege because,  cumulatively, billing records constitute a mechanical compilation of information that, at least incidentally, reveals an attorney’s strategy and thought processes.” *13-14.

“[B]illing records reveal when and where attorneys strategically deploy a client’s resources; which issues were addressed by experienced lawyers  as compared to less experienced counsel; the subject-matter expertise of an attorney working on a particular aspect of the case; and who was hired as consultants—including consulting experts and jury consultants—and when. This information provides detailed information regarding a party’s litigation decisions and also illuminates the relative significance of or concern about particular matters.” *17-18.

Attorney-client privilege (TRE 503)

“Billing records constitute ‘communication[s] made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between a party and the party’s representatives or among a party’s representatives.’”*16.

Outside the bounds of permissible discovery (TRCP 192.3 & 195)

“Importantly, a party is limited in the tools available to discover information concerning expert witnesses, even though the information may otherwise be within the scope of testifying-expert discovery. Rule 192.3(e) sets forth the scope of information that parties may discover about a testifying expert . . . . Rule 195 addresses the methods for obtaining such information, limiting testifying-expert discovery to that acquired through disclosures, expert reports, and oral depositions [*36]  of expert witnesses. To minimize undue expense and curb discovery abuse, Rule 195 does not provide for interrogatories or requests for production like the discovery requests at issue here. Further, because the disputed discovery requests are not permissible methods of obtaining information discoverable under Rule 192.3(e), the exception to the work-product privilege in Rule 192.5(c)(1) does not apply.” *35-36.

“Patently irrelevant” (TRE 401)

“To the extent factual information about hourly rates and aggregate attorney fees is not privileged, that information is generally irrelevant and nondiscoverable because it does not establish or tend to establish the reasonableness or necessity of the attorney fees an opposing party has incurred. A party’s litigation expenditures reflect only the value that party has assigned to litigating the matter, which may be influenced by myriad party-specific interests. Absent a fee-shifting claim, a party’s attorney-fee expenditures need not be reasonable or necessary for the particular case. Barring unusual circumstances, allowing discovery of such information would spawn unnecessary case-within-a-case litigation devoted to determining the reasonableness and necessity of attorney-fee expenditures that are not at issue in the litigation. This is not a proper discovery objective.” *2-3.

“For the reasons explained above, we agree with those cases concluding such information is generally not discoverable and, in the ordinary case, ‘patently irrelevant.’” *32.

Unduly prejudicial (TRE 403)

“In sum, barring unusual circumstances, an opposing party’s attorney-fee information is not relevant because there is no reasonable expectation that the information will aid the dispute’s resolution. Moreover, whatever marginal relevance might theoretically exist would not come close to surpassing competing concerns about undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and abusive discovery practices, among others. Aside from lacking genuine probative value, discovery of an opposing party’s attorney-billing information should generally not be permitted for these additional reasons.” *34.

Wait, what about redaction?

“We also conclude that redacting privileged information—such as the specific topics researched or the descriptions of the subject of phone calls—would be insufficient as a matter of law to mask the attorney’s thought processes and strategies. The chronological nature of billing records reveals when, how, and what resources were deployed. With this knowledge, a party in the same proceeding could deduce litigation strategy as to specific or global matters.” *19.

Yes, you can lose the protection

“We acknowledge that an opposing party may waive its work-product privilege through offensive use—perhaps by relying on its billing records to contest the reasonableness of opposing counsel’s attorney fees or to recover its own attorney fees.” *20-21.

“Making a claim for attorney fees or using attorney fees as a comparator in challenging an opponent’s fee request puts a party’s attorney fees at issue in the litigation. In addition, designating counsel as an expert opens the door to expert-witness discovery as provided and limited by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” *40


And there you have it. This five-level protection should foreclose any dispute in the vast majority of cases where a party is not seeking fees, or improperly using their own fees as a yardstick to attack an opposing party’s fees. Just be careful when designating experts: be clear your expert is not reviewing or relying on your fee bills in reaching their opinion. If these pitfalls are avoided, you can say, with overwhelming authority, hands off my fee bills!

And a very Happy New Year from TexAppBlog!

Billing “A lot of Time” Preparing for Trial is Insufficient to Support Fee Award, Says Texas Supreme Court

alotAlthough the Texas Supreme Court handed down its El Apple opinion over 20 months ago, attorneys continue to submit inadequate affidavits and fail to provide redacted fee bills in discovery, precluding  recovery of attorney’s fees. Don’t say we didn’t warn you. In City of Laredo v. Montano, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in El Apple and confirmed that the days of submitting conclusory affidavits and hyperbolic testimony as “evidence” of attorney’s fees are gone (in most cases).

At issue in City of Laredo was the attempted condemnation of property in the central business district of Laredo owned by the Montano family. In December of 2004, the City decided it needed the Montanos’ property to widen a street and build a pedestrian plaza near the bridge. The Montanos refused to sell. The family claimed that the City had no public purpose for their land but rather merely intended to benefit El Portal Center, a private entity operating a nearby shopping center.

The City filed suit to condemn the property in March of 2006, and the case was tried to a jury about four years later. The jury agreed with the Montanos that the City had no authorized public use for the property and awarded attorney’s fees and expenses. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury verdict, awarding the Montanos $446,000 in attorney’s fees through trial, additional attorney’s fees on appeal, and additional sums for appraisals and other expenses the property owners incurred. The City appealed the attorney’s fees award.

A Tale of Two Attorneys

During the litigation, the Montanos were represented by multiple attorneys, including Richard J. Gonzalez and Adriana Benavides-Maddox. Gonzalez testified to performing the following tasks in the Montanos’ defense: (1) making an open records request; (2) searching through city council meeting minutes regarding the Montano family’s property; (3) watching 38 DVDs of the city-council meetings (some more than once); (4) visiting the premises many times; (5) conducting “a lot” of legal research; (6) preparing the pleadings and motions; (7) spending time in court for appearances; (8) spending “countless hours” preparing for and taking depositions; (9) reviewing the transcripts and DVDs of the depositions; and (10) preparing for trial and trying the case. Gonzalez further testified to working on the case for 226 weeks, estimating that he devoted on average “a barebones minimum” of six hours a week to the case.

The Court held that Gonzalez’s testimony that he spent “a lot of time getting ready for the lawsuit,” conducted “a lot of legal research,” visited the premises “many, many, many, many times,” and spent “countless” hours on motions and depositions was not evidence of a reasonable attorney’s fee under the lodestar method. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (citing El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 763 (Tex. 2012)). In fact, the Court characterized Gonzalez’s testimony as “simply devoid of substance.”

The Court reaffirmed El Apple, noting that “a lodestar calculation requires certain basic proof, including itemizing specific tasks, the time required for those tasks, and the rate charged by the person performing the work.” Id. (citing El Apple, 370 S.W.3d at 765). The Court further noted that “in all but the simplest cases, the attorney would probably have to refer to some type of record or documentation to provide this information.” Based on this reasoning, the Court reversed the award of attorney’s fees to Gonzalez and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Benavides-Maddox’s testimony, on the other hand, was not deficient. She testified that she used a billing system to keep track of her time in the case and that she had billed, and been paid, $25,000 for her work up to trial. She further testified that her contract with the Montanos provided for payment at her $200 hourly rate. Finally, she testified that she arrived early each day of trial and continued to work after the jury was dismissed preparing for the next day. She estimated that she worked about twelve hours per day during the course of the five-day trial. The Court noted:

While similar to Gonzalez’s estimation that he worked the case an average of six hours a week during his four-year involvement, it is also different in significant respects. The billing inquiry here involves contemporaneous events and discrete tasks—the trial and associated preparation for each succeeding day. Moreover, it is a task the opponent witnessed at least in part, having also participated in the trial. Despite this knowledge, Benavides-Maddox’s charges relating to the trial were not questioned on cross-examination. Unlike Gonzalez’s testimony, Benavides-Maddox’s testimony about her unbilled trial work is some evidence on which to base an award of attorney’s fees because it concerns contemporaneous or immediately completed work for which she had not had time to bill, or presumably even record, in her billing system.

Id. at 737. The Court affirmed the award attributable to Benavides-Maddox’s fees.

The tale of these two attorneys provides an important moral: he that does not keep (and submit) contemporaneous billing records or other documentation recorded reasonably close to the time when the work is performed is a man awaiting his folly.

El Apple: A Delicious Spanish Fruit or a New Pitfall for Attorneys Seeking Fees?

apples2Although the Texas Supreme Court handed down its El Apple opinion over 10 months ago, attorneys continue to submit inadequate affidavits and fail to provide redacted fee bills in discovery, causing a number of trial courts to outright deny the recovery of attorney’s fees even in cases where such fees are available under the various statutes authorizing recovery of attorney’s fees.

The pitfall is an easy one to fall into. That is because for nearly 30 years an attorney could submit an affidavit containing the number of hours worked, the rate charged, and an obligatory statement that the fees are “reasonable and necessary,” and this would be sufficient evidence for an award of attorney’s fees. Alas, not any more.

The Texas Supreme Court now requires, at least in cases utilizing the Lodestar Method to calculate attorney’s fees, that an attorney submit “contemporaneous billing records or other documentation recorded reasonably close to the time when the work is performed.” El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 763 (Tex. 2012). These billing records must include “at a minimum, documentation of the services performed, who performed them and at what hourly rate, when they were performed, and how much time the work required.” Id. at 764.

There is an open question as to whether these new requirements for detailed, contemporaneous billing records apply in cases not relying on the Lodestar Method for calculating attorney’s fees. Given the broad language of the El Apple opinion, however, it is likely that the reasoning is applicable in all instances where an attorney is seeking “reasonable and necessary” attorney’s fees, encompassing nearly all attorney’s fees awards in Texas. A prudent trial attorney would be well-advised not only to keep reasonably-detailed contemporaneous billing records, but to provide redacted copies of those records to opposing counsel before the discovery deadline to avoid issues of admissibility at trial.

While El Apple will continue to be a poisonous fruit to unwitting trial lawyers in their efforts to recover attorney’s fees, savvy trial lawyers will savor the sweet taste of victory when they use this appellate gem to obtain a well-documented and reasoned fee award rightfully belonging to the client.

The full El Apple case can be found here: http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2012/jun/100490.pdf.